Identifying differences in the experience of (in)authenticity: a latent class analysis approach.

Generally, psychologists consider state authenticity - that is, the subjective sense of being one's true self - to be a unitary and unidimensional construct, such that (a) the phenomenological experience of authenticity is thought to be similar no matter its trigger, and (b) inauthenticity is thought to be simply the opposing pole (on the same underlying construct) of authenticity. Using latent class analysis, we put this conceptualization to a test. In order to avoid over-reliance on a Western conceptualization of authenticity, we used a cross-cultural sample (N = 543), comprising participants from Western, South-Asian, East-Asian, and South-East Asian cultures. Participants provided either a narrative in which the described when they felt most like being themselves or one in which they described when they felt least like being themselves. The analysis identified six distinct classes of experiences: two authenticity classes ("everyday" and "extraordinary"), three inauthenticity classes ("self-conscious," "deflated," and "extraordinary"), and a class representing convergence between authenticity and inauthenticity. The classes were phenomenologically distinct, especially with respect to negative affect, private and public self-consciousness, and self-esteem. Furthermore, relatively more interdependent cultures were less likely to report experiences of extraordinary (in)authenticity than relatively more independent cultures. Understanding the many facets of (in)authenticity may enable researchers to connect different findings and explain why the attainment of authenticity can be difficult.

I feel good, therefore I am real: testing the causal influence of mood on state authenticity.

Although the literature has focused on individual differences in authenticity, recent findings suggest that authenticity is sensitive to context; that is, it is also a state. We extended this perspective by examining whether incidental affect influences authenticity. In three experiments, participants felt more authentic when in a relatively positive than negative mood. The causal role of affect in authenticity was consistent across a diverse set of mood inductions, including explicit (Experiments 1 and 3) and implicit (Experiment 2) methods. The link between incidental affect and state authenticity was not moderated by ability to down-regulate negative affect (Experiments 1 and 3) nor was it explained by negative mood increasing private self-consciousness or decreasing access to the self system (Experiment 3). The results indicate that mood is used as information to assess one's sense of authenticity.

How does "being real" feel? The experience of state authenticity.

OBJECTIVE: We propose that the experience of state authenticity-the subjective sense of being one's true self-ought to be considered separately from trait authenticity as well as from prescriptions regarding what should make people feel authentic. METHODS: In Study 1 (N = 104), online participants rated the frequency of and motivation for experiences of authenticity and inauthenticity. Studies 2 (N = 268) and 3 (N = 93) asked (local or online, respectively) participants to describe their experiences of authenticity or inauthenticity. Participants in Studies 1 and 2 also completed measures of trait authenticity, and participants in Study 3 rated their experience with respect to several phenomenological dimensions. RESULTS: Study 1 demonstrated that people are motivated to experience state authenticity and avoid inauthenticity and that such experiences are common, regardless of one's degree of trait authenticity. Coding of Study 2's narratives identified the emotions accompanying and needs fulfilled in each state. Trait authenticity generally did not qualify the nature of (in)authentic experiences. Study 3 corroborated the results of Study 2 and further revealed positive mood and nostalgia as consequences of reflecting on experiences of authenticity. CONCLUSIONS: We discuss implications of these findings for conceptualizations of authenticity and the self.

Too much of a good thing? Variety is confusing in mate choice.

Choice variety is supposed to increase the likelihood that a chooser's preferences are satisfied. To assess the effects of variety on real-world mate choice, we analysed human dating decisions across 84 speed-dating events (events in which people go on a series of sequential 'mini-dates'). Results showed that choosers made fewer proposals (positive dating decisions) at events in which the available dates showed greater variety across such attributes as age, height, occupation and education, and this effect was particularly strong when choosers were confronted with a larger number of opposite-sex speed daters. Additionally, participants attending events in which the available options showed greater variety across these attributes were less likely to choose the consensually preferred mate option and more likely to choose no one at all. In contexts in which time is a limited resource, choice variety-rather than facilitating choice quality or increasing choosiness-is confusing and potentially detrimental to choice quality.

How humans cognitively manage an abundance of mate options.

To contribute to researchers' understanding of how humans choose mates, we examined how the number of mate options influenced the dating decisions made by 1,868 women and 1,870 men across 84 speed-dating events. Multilevel modeling of these decisions revealed that when faced with abundant choice, choosers paid less attention to characteristics requiring more time to elicit and evaluate (e.g., occupational status and educational attainment) and more attention to characteristics that are quickly and easily assessed (e.g., height and weight). Human mate choice sits squarely within the domain of general cognition, as this study shows it to be constrained by bounds on cognitive resources.

Different cognitive processes underlie human mate choices and mate preferences.

Based on undergraduates' self-reports of mate preferences for various traits and self-perceptions of their own levels on those traits, Buston and Emlen [Buston PM, Emlen ST (2003) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 100:8805-8810] concluded that modern human mate choices do not reflect predictions of tradeoffs from evolutionary theory but instead follow a "likes-attract" pattern, where people choose mates who match their self-perceptions. However, reported preferences need not correspond to actual mate choices, which are more relevant from an evolutionary perspective. In a study of 46 adults participating in a speed-dating event, we were largely able to replicate Buston and Emlen's self-report results in a pre-event questionnaire, but we found that the stated preferences did not predict actual choices made during the speed-dates. Instead, men chose women based on their physical attractiveness, whereas women, who were generally much more discriminating than men, chose men whose overall desirability as a mate matched the women's self-perceived physical attractiveness. Unlike the cognitive processes that Buston and Emlen inferred from self-reports, this pattern of results from actual mate choices is very much in line with the evolutionary predictions of parental investment theory.

We want the same thing: projection in judgments of sexual intent.

This article details two studies investigating the proximal role of social projection (i.e., assumed similarity) in judgments of sexual intent. Study 1 demonstrates that men and women who have a greater desire for casual sex are more likely to perceive sexual intent in others. Study 2 replicates this finding in a more realistic context and, further, situates judgments of sexual intent squarely into the cognitive domain, as results show that projection of casual sexual motivation is more likely when the target is similar to the perceiver and when the target's motivation is relatively ambiguous to begin with.

The reliability of the DRM paradigm as a measure of individual differences in false memories.

Despite considerable research on the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, little attention has been paid to the reliability of the paradigm as a measure of individual differences. In the present research, we examined the reliability of the DRM paradigm in a 2-week test-retest design. This analysis showed that the false memories produced in the paradigm were quite stable across the 2-week period and that this stability had both global (cross-list) and list-specific components. In contrast, correct memories showed only global stability across the testing period.